Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade Organization by Hopewell, Kristen
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the
World Trade Organization
Citation for published version:
Hopewell, K 2014, 'Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade
Organization' Review of International Political Economy, pp. 1-28. DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2014.927387
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1080/09692290.2014.927387
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Review of International Political Economy
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Hopewell, K. (2014). Different paths to power: The rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade
Organization. Review of International Political Economy, 1-28. 10.1080/09692290.2014.927387
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIFFERENT PATHS TO POWER:   
THE RISE OF BRAZIL, INDIA AND CHINA AT THE WTO 
 
 
Kristen Hopewell* 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Sociology 
University of British Columbia 
3333 University Way 
Kelowna, BC V1V 1V7 
Tel.: (250)807-4505 
Email: kristen.hopewell@ubc.ca 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
New powers, such as China, India and Brazil, are challenging the traditional dominance of the 
US in the governance of the global economy.  It is generally taken for granted that the rise of 
new powers is simply a reflection of their growing economic might.  In this article, however, I 
challenge this assumption by drawing on the case of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to 
show that the forces driving the rise of new powers are more heterogeneous and complex than 
suggested by a simple economic determinism.  I argue that these countries have in fact taken 
different paths to power:  while China’s rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic 
might, the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership 
of developing country coalitions, which enabled them to exercise influence above their economic 
weight.  One important result is that Brazil and India have assumed a more aggressive and 
activist position in WTO negotiations than China and played a greater role in shaping the agenda 
of the Doha Round.  Thus, although the new powers are frequently grouped together (as the 
“BRICs”, for example), this masks considerable variation in their sources of power and behavior 
in global economic governance. 
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Introduction 
The existing international economic architecture was created during the era of American 
hegemony that followed World War II and heavily shaped by US power (Gilpin 1987; Ruggie 
1996).  For over half a century, the institutions charged with governing the global economy – 
including the World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank – were dominated by the US and other advanced-industrialized states (Babb 2009; Chorev 
2008).  Developing countries were largely excluded from global economic decision-making and 
their interests severely marginalized.  However, the dynamics of global economic governance are 
currently being transformed, as developing countries such as China, India and Brazil become 
increasingly important actors and challenge the dominance of the Global North.  The growing 
centrality of these actors is evident across a range of institutions.  In the midst of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, for instance, the Group of 8 (G8) rich countries was replaced by the G20 Leaders 
Summit (G20), a mixed group of developed and developing countries, as the primary forum for 
coordinating the management of the global economy and the response to the crisis.  The 
Financial Stability Board – responsible for overseeing coordination of global financial regulation 
– was subsequently expanded to include the developing country members of the G20.  The 
voting structures of the IMF and World Bank are in the process of being reformed to increase the 
weight of major developing countries.1  China, India and Brazil have played a prominent role in 
the international climate change negotiations.  At the WTO, these three countries have entered 
the inner circle of power and emerged as important actors in the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. 
This shift in global power relations has been identified as one of the most important 
transformations in modern history and fueled a large and growing literature (Beeson and Bell 
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2009; Hurrell 2006; Margulis and Porter 2013; Mittelman 2013; Stephen 2012; Young 2010).  
Much of this scholarship has focused on seeking to assess the agendas of the new powers and the 
implications of their rise, such as whether they are likely to be supporters or challengers of the 
existing international economic order.  Yet, the forces driving the rise of these new powers have 
received comparatively little attention.   Few studies have sought to analyze in detail why and 
how such countries have come to play a more central role within specific governance 
institutions.  Instead, it is widely assumed that the rise of new powers in global economic 
governance is simply a reflection of their growing economic might (Arrighi 2007; Cooper and 
Schwanen 2009; Emmott 2008; Hung 2009; Jacques 2009; Wade 2011; Zakaria 2008).  
Discussions of the emerging powers emphasize their economic capabilities, as the following 
example from John Ikenberry (2008: 25) illustrates:  
China is well on its way to becoming a formidable global power.  The size of its 
economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970s and, 
by some estimates, will double again over the next decade.  It has become one of 
the world’s major manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the 
global supply of iron, steel, and coal.  It has accumulated massive foreign 
reserves, worth more than $1 trillion at the end of 2006. …  Indeed, whereas the 
Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is 
emerging as both a military and an economic rival – heralding a profound shift in 
the distribution of global power. 
 
He later continues (35): 
 
The United States and Europe must find room at the table not only for China but 
also for countries such as Brazil, India, and South Africa.  A Goldman Sachs 
report on the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) noted that by 
2050 these countries’ economies could together be larger than those of the 
original G-6 countries (Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States) combined.  
 
This depiction is echoed in the popular media, with The Economist (2010) for example stating:  
“The BRICs matter because of their economic weight.”  The World Bank (2010) offers a similar 
assessment of the rise of new powers:  “Increased income and growth … means increasing 
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influence.”  The dominant interpretation is thus that power shifts in global economic governance 
are being driven by changes in the relative economic power of states.2 
One result of the emphasis on economic might is that attention has overwhelmingly 
focused on China (Arrighi 2007; Babones 2011; Beeson 2009; Breslin 2010; Emmott 2008; 
Hung 2009; Jacques 2009; Subramanian 2011).  As the previous quote from Ikenberry 
exemplifies, China is widely seen as the key rising new power and challenger to the US, based 
on its large economy, rapid growth rates, major role in world trade, and considerable financial 
power.  Where India and Brazil are brought into discussions of contemporary power shifts, they 
are typically positioned as secondary, since they possess considerably fewer of the capabilities 
that are seen as making China powerful.  China is now the world’s second largest economy, after 
the US, and the world’s largest exporter of goods.  Yet Brazil and India’s economies are only a 
fraction of the size of China’s (with Brazil’s GDP $2.4bn and India $1.9bn compared to China’s 
$8.3bn); they play a much smaller role in world trade (while China’s exports represent 10 percent 
of world trade, Brazil and India’s constitute only 1 and 2 percent, respectively); and their 
economic growth has been far slower (particularly in the case of Brazil, whose growth rates over 
the past 15 years have averaged only 3 percent compared to 10 percent in China and 7 percent in 
India).3  In economic terms, Brazil and India are lightweights compared to China. 
In contrast to the predominant emphasis on their economic capabilities, however, this 
article seeks to provide a richer and more nuanced account of the rise to power and behavior of 
Brazil, India and China in global economic governance by examining the case of the WTO.  The 
WTO is a core multilateral economic institution, responsible for setting and enforcing the rules 
of the international trading system.  It has been a key site of struggle over global power relations 
and was one of the first sites where Brazil, India and China emerged as major players in global 
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economic governance.  The analysis presented here is based on 15 months of field research 
conducted from 2007-2010 at the WTO in Geneva, as well as in Beijing, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, 
Brasilia and Washington, including 157 interviews with negotiators and other senior officials, 
industry representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ethnographic observation, 
and analysis of negotiating texts, proposals and other documents.4  As the focus of the paper is 
on interactions among states within the WTO, an analysis of trade policymaking in the emerging 
powers is beyond its scope, but has been extensively documented elsewhere.5    
Drawing on the case of the WTO, I show that although the new developing country 
powers are frequently grouped together (as part of the “BRICs”, for example), this masks 
important variation in their sources of power and behavior in global economic governance.6   I 
argue that the forces driving the rise of new powers are more diverse and complex than 
suggested by a simple economic determinism and that these countries have in fact taken different 
paths to power.  While China’s rise has been more closely tied to its growing economic might, 
the rise of Brazil and India has been driven primarily by their mobilization and leadership of 
developing country coalitions, which has enabled them to exercise influence far above their 
economic weight.  My intent is not to deny the importance of economic factors, but to suggest 
that focusing solely on the economic provides an overly simplistic reading of contemporary 
power shifts.   
Indeed, an account centered exclusively on the economic capabilities of states would be 
unable to explain much of what has occurred at the WTO in the last decade.  In contrast to 
expectations of a dyadic shift in power from the US to China, I show that Brazil and India were 
the first developing countries to successfully challenge the US and they emerged as major 
players at the WTO several years before China.  Moreover, it was in fact Brazil and India who 
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overturned the traditional power structure at the WTO, rather than China.  I demonstrate that not 
only do the rising powers have different sources of power but, as a result, they have also 
exercised different forms of influence.  Despite their relatively small economies and limited roles 
in world trade, Brazil and India assumed a more aggressive and activist position in WTO trade 
negotiations than China and, for much of the Doha Round, were far more influential in shaping 
the dynamics and agenda of the negotiations.  Towards the endgame stage of negotiations, China 
ultimately came to have significant impact, but its impact was primarily as a reactive veto-power 
in contrast to the proactive agenda-setting role played by Brazil and India.7   
Conceptualizing Contemporary Power Shifts in Global Economic Governance 
Drawing on the case of the WTO, this article seeks to problematize and unpack the 
origins and nature of contemporary power shifts and the increased power of Brazil, India and 
China in global economic governance.  As James Mittelman (2013) observes, accounts of 
contemporary power shifts have been heavily shaped by the traditional realist conception of 
international relations, which defines a state’s power in terms of its economic and military 
capabilities (Kennedy 1987; Waltz 1979).  These are viewed as the essential sources of “raw” or 
“hard” power that determine the position of states within an overarching global power hierarchy 
(Organski 1968).  Although more complex conceptualizations of power have emerged within 
international relations, including the growth of a rich constructivist literature (Barnett and Duvall 
2005; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Mattern 2008), the narrow realist conception of power as material 
resources has been highly influential in shaping how contemporary power shifts are understood. 
The prevailing view is that current changes taking place in the global economic 
governance institutions are a reflection of structural changes in the distribution of economic 
power among states.  According to realism, international organizations mirror the distribution of 
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power in the international system and act as vehicles for the interests of the most economically 
and militarily powerful states.  Yet, institutionalist scholars have long argued that international 
organizations not only reproduce but can also reconfigure power relations among states (Conti 
2011).  Notably, institutions create spaces for alliance-building and leadership that can enhance 
the influence of economically or militarily weaker states (Drahos 2003; Hampson 1990; Higgott 
and Cooper 1990; Narlikar 2003).  The ability of a state to attract followers and mobilize other 
states into effective coalitions can serve as an important form of power in global governance. 
Although largely overlooked in discussions of contemporary power shifts, an extensive 
literature has documented a surge of developing country coalition-building at the WTO (Clapp 
2006; Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Grant 2007; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Narlikar and Tussie 2004; 
Taylor 2007).  It is no coincidence that the rise of new powers from the Global South took place 
amidst a rising tide of developing country activism and unrest at the WTO.  Coming out of the 
previous Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-94), there was growing dissatisfaction 
among developing countries about their exclusion from decision-making and the profoundly 
unbalanced results of that round. The protests of developing countries, combined with those of 
civil society (such as the massive street protests at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial intended to 
launch the new round), created a legitimacy crisis for the WTO and pressure for greater inclusion 
of developing countries in the organization’s decision-making.  Developing countries channeled 
their frustrations into coalition-building in an attempt to redress power imbalances and assert 
their interests.  These coalitions greatly heightened the power of developing countries in the 
Doha Round and created a new politics of North-South confrontation at the WTO (Hurrell and 
Narlikar 2006; Taylor 2007).     
The scholarship on developing country coalitions offers an important contribution to our 
8 
 
understanding of the transformation that occurred at the WTO.  Yet within this literature, there 
has been little explicit comparison of the role that developing country coalitions played in the 
rise of Brazil and India in contrast to China.  Most accounts tend to group the emerging powers 
together and treat their relationships to developing country coalitions as similar.  The three new 
powers are often, for example, identified collectively as leaders of the Group of 20 (G20-T) 
coalition at the WTO (Clapp 2006; Grant 2007; Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Narlikar and Tussie 
2004).8  In the analysis that follows, however, I show that while Brazil and India were activist 
and entrepreneurial leaders of developing country coalitions, China was decidedly not.  On the 
contrary, China – despite (or more accurately because of) its economic might – was a follower 
rather than a leader in these coalitions.  The relationships of the new powers to developing 
country coalitions differed fundamentally, and I will argue that this difference was not incidental 
but highly significant.  It is connected to critical differences in their behavior, their sources of 
power, and the types of influence they have exercised at the WTO.  The analysis presented here 
builds on and extends the existing literature on WTO coalitions; however, it is distinct in its 
comparison of the role that coalitions played in the rise of the new powers and its emphasis on 
the different paths to power taken by Brazil and India, on the one hand, and China, on the other.   
Despite a burgeoning literature on the emerging powers, comparison of their role in 
global economic governance has been limited.  Research on emerging powers in world politics 
has been conducted mainly in the form of case studies on individual countries (Armijo and 
Burges 2010; Dauvergne and Farias 2012; Hopewell 2013; Lima and Hirst 2006; Scott and 
Wilkinson 2013).  Only rarely have emerging powers been analyzed in a comparative perspective 
(Ban and Blyth 2013; Narlikar 2013; Schirm 2010).  A comparative analysis of Brazil, India and 
China at the WTO highlights important distinctions among the emerging powers and in their 
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behavior in global economic governance. 
Some critics have questioned whether apparent power shifts in global economic 
governance are more symbolic or superficial than real.  Skeptics contend that the traditional 
powers retain their dominance in governance institutions and the emerging powers have yet to 
exercise significant voice and influence or become a source of initiative and agenda-setting 
(Beeson and Bell 2009; Pinto, Macdonald and Marshall 2011; Subacchi 2008; Wade 2011).  In 
the analysis that follows, I show that there has indeed been a real shift in power at the WTO.  
Brazil, India and China have not only gained seats at the high table, but also come to play pivotal 
roles in the Doha Round, though the nature of their influence has differed.   
Power Shifts at the WTO 
The WTO, and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
work through successive rounds of negotiations to progressively liberalize trade.  Formally, 
agreements are reached on the basis of consensus and each member is afforded an equal vote 
(“one-member, one-vote”).  Initially, the consensus-based decision-making of the GATT/WTO 
appears remarkably democratic compared to the IMF and World Bank, with their weighted 
voting systems and veto power accorded to the US.  The institutional design of the GATT/WTO 
would appear to afford more scope for developing countries to use coalition-building to influence 
decision-making outcomes.  Despite this, however, for nearly its entire history, the GATT/WTO 
has been dominated by the US and other rich countries.  In practice, the most significant 
negotiations take place in informal meetings of small groups of states (called “Green Room” 
meetings).  Once an agreement is reached within this core group, it is then extended out to the 
rest of the organization’s membership.  This group constitutes the elite inner circle of the WTO – 
those states that are recognized as key players and exercise the most influence over the 
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negotiations.  Until recently, agreements were negotiated among “the Quad” – the US, EU, 
Canada and Japan – and imposed upon the rest of the organization’s membership effectively as a 
fait accompli (Kapoor 2006).  The US and EU were the primary states to advance initiatives and 
they constructed a trading order that suited their own interests (Porter 2005).  Historically, 
developing countries were highly disadvantaged within the institution, largely excluded from 
decision-making and ignored; they rarely tabled proposals and were often blocked when they 
sought to advance initiatives (Raghavan 2000; Steinberg 2002).  
However, over the course of the Doha Round, which began in 2001, a significant 
transformation has taken place at the WTO.  After 2003, the old “Quad” was replaced by a series 
of core negotiating groups centered on the US, EU, Brazil, and India.  These four states have 
been at the heart of the negotiations since then.  Beginning in 2008, they were joined by China.  
Brazil, India and China have become key players whose assent is considered essential to 
securing a Doha agreement:  in the words of one negotiator, “now, you can’t conclude any deal at 
the WTO without them.”9  As the following sections will show, far from merely symbolic, these 
power shifts have had a profound impact on the WTO and the Doha Round.   
The Rise of Brazil and India 
 The factors that propelled Brazil and India into the inner circle of power at the WTO 
differed from China.  Unlike China, discussed in the next section, Brazil and India could not rely 
on their economic might and had to strategically maneuver to increase their status and influence.  
The emergence of Brazil and India as major players at the WTO was intertwined with a broader 
revolt on the part of developing countries.  Brazil and India were key figures in fostering and 
channeling this uprising and it played a major role in fueling their rise to power.   
Emergence and Impact of the G20-T 
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At the start of the Doha Round, the US and EU remained firmly in the driver’s seat:  they 
played the central role in formulating the negotiating mandate and the negotiations continued to 
center on the old “Quad.”  However, the emergence of the G20-T – a coalition of developing 
countries led by Brazil and India – at the Cancun Ministerial in 2003 marked a critical turning 
point.  The Ministerial was intended to be an important milestone in the progress of the Doha 
Round, with negotiations shifting to determining the more concrete and specific terms of the 
deal.  In advance of Cancun, the US and EU reached an agreement among themselves and put 
forward a joint proposal on agriculture.  This proposal prompted a strong reaction from 
developing countries, who saw it as an effort to force them to lower their trade barriers, while 
allowing the US and EU to maintain their trade distorting subsidies.  For many, this presaged a 
repeat of the Uruguay Round when a private compromise between the US and EU (the Blair 
House Accord) served as the basis for the ultimate agreement and obliterated the hopes of 
developing countries for making gains in the round.  Once again, it looked like developing 
countries were going to get a highly unbalanced agreement.  Prompted by the US-EU proposal, 
Brazil approached India with a plan for forming an alliance to oppose that initiative.  The two 
countries joined forces and together succeeded in assembling a coalition of developing countries 
that represented over half the world’s population and two-thirds of its farmers.  The G20-T 
united not only to block the US-EU proposal but, driven primarily by Brazil, also arrived at 
Cancun with its own technically sophisticated counter-proposal that specifically targeted US and 
EU agriculture subsidies.  Several other developing country coalitions emerged in the process 
leading up to Cancun (including the Core Group, the Cotton-4, and the G33), joining existing 
groupings (such as the African Group, the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group, the LDC 
Group, and the Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs)), and there was significant consultation 
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and cooperation among them (Narlikar and Tussie 2004).  Amidst the proliferation of developing 
country coalitions in the Doha Round, the G20-T played a central and pivotal role because of its 
proactive agenda that turned the tables on the traditional powers by going after their agriculture 
and trade policies, backed by a technically substantive and astute proposal.  As a result, the 
Cancun Ministerial took shape as a dramatic battle between developed and developing countries 
and ultimately ended in collapse, with the G20-T’s block of the US-EU proposal a central factor 
in the breakdown. 
 Under the leadership of Brazil and India, the emergence of the G20-T produced a tectonic 
shift at the WTO, bringing an end to the US and EU “cartel over agenda setting and compromise 
brokering.”(Evenett 2007)  From that point, it became impossible for the US and EU to secure a 
Doha agreement without the assent of Brazil and India as representatives of the G20-T and the 
developing world more broadly.  Their leadership of developing countries in opposing the US 
and EU launched Brazil and India into the inner circle of negotiations, as key players who were 
considered essential to breaking the stalemate and securing a deal.  In the words of one WTO 
Secretariat official, the “creation of the G20-T completely imploded the Quad.”10  Despite the 
fact that several other states (including Japan and Canada, as well as China, Mexico and South 
Korea) had larger economies and more significant roles in world trade, Brazil and India 
displaced Japan and Canada from the inner circle. 
In addition to upending the traditional power structure of the WTO, Brazil and India’s 
leadership of the G20-T fundamentally altered the dynamic and agenda of the Doha Round.  The 
agenda-setting process that takes place between the launch and conclusion of a round is critical 
to determining its final outcome and the time when powerful countries flex their muscles 
(Steinberg 2002).  Agriculture has been a central issue since the start of the round, as one of the 
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least liberalized sectors of global trade.  When the negotiations began, they centered on demands 
from the US and the Cairns Group of agricultural exporters that the EU and Japan eliminate their 
trade distorting policies; however, over the course of the round, the negotiations were 
transformed into a struggle between developed and developing countries centered on US and EU 
subsidies (Clapp 2006).  As a negotiator stated, “at the start of this round, the US saw itself in an 
offensive position.  It had no idea it would be a target on agriculture.  But now it has become the 
key focus of the negotiations.”11  There has been a dramatic shift in roles:  for the first time, the 
US – historically the key aggressor in the GATT/WTO – found itself isolated and on the 
defensive, while developing countries assumed the role of demandeurs.   
The coalitions led by Brazil and India had a major impact on the negotiating agenda, 
successfully putting issues like rich country agricultural subsidies and market access, as well as 
special safeguards and flexibilities for developing countries (provisions advanced by another 
coalition, the G33, discussed below), at the center of the negotiations.  Furthermore, the 
negotiating texts since Cancun have substantively reflected many of their proposals.  The G20-T, 
for example, secured:  a tiered formula for reducing subsidies (“domestic support”), ensuring that 
countries that provide the most support are required to make the biggest reductions, and stiffer 
criteria for cutting domestic support, such as product-specific caps; substantial reductions in 
domestic support (compared to historical bound levels), with the EU cutting overall trade 
distorting support (OTDS) by 80 percent and the US by 70 percent; the elimination of export 
subsidies and parallel disciplines on export credit and food aid; non-extension of the Peace 
Clause (protecting developed countries from WTO challenges), countering the long-standing 
position of the US and EU; and a “tiered” formula for reducing tariffs, rather than the “blended” 
formula sought by the US and EU.  Although, as discussed below, the future of the Doha Round 
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is now in doubt, these coalitions significantly shaped the content of any prospective agreement.  
This represents a dramatic departure from the past, when developing countries had little or no 
influence over the shape of GATT/WTO agreements.   
Brazil-India Partnership 
The alliance between Brazil and India that forms the basis for the G20-T is surprising 
given their opposing negotiating positions.  Brazil – which over the last two decades has 
emerged as one of the world’s leading agricultural exporters – has defined its primary interest in 
the Doha Round as seeking to expand markets for its agricultural exports.12  It is widely viewed 
as being among the biggest potential winners from the Round and has been one of its strongest 
supporters (Polaski 2006).  Brazil has actively worked to construct an image of itself as a leader 
of developing countries, fighting to hold rich countries accountable to WTO rules and pushing 
them to liberalize their markets.  Beyond the G20-T, Brazil successfully waged two landmark 
disputes against US cotton subsidies and EU sugar export subsidies.  Brazil’s victories revealed 
major inconsistencies between US and EU agriculture policies and WTO rules and raised the 
prospect that those countries could be subject to a wave of future WTO challenges.  Despite 
Brazil’s major agro-industrial interests, it succeeded in portraying the G20-T and these disputes 
as a shared struggle of poor, developing country farmers against the rich countries, fostering an 
image of Brazil as a hero of the developing world taking on the traditional powers in a David-
and-Goliath-like struggle (Hopewell 2013). 
In contrast to Brazil’s export interests, India’s negotiating position more closely 
resembles that of most developing countries at the WTO, with major defensive interests in 
agriculture:  it has a weak agricultural sector consisting primarily of peasant farmers, who are 
highly vulnerable to trade liberalization.  India has historically been a leading voice among 
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developing countries at the GATT/WTO, fiercely resistant to efforts by the US and other 
developed countries to force developing countries to open their markets.  In the Uruguay Round, 
for example, India was a strident (though ultimately unsuccessful) opponent of an aggressive 
push by the US and EU to expand trade rules into the new areas of services, investment and 
intellectual property, which it correctly forecast would impose significant costs on developing 
countries (Shadlen 2005; Wade 2003).  India strongly opposed the launch of the Doha Round, 
arguing instead that implementation issues and other lingering problems for developing countries 
from the Uruguay Round needed to be dealt with first.  Like Brazil, India is also widely seen as a 
leader of developing countries at the WTO, but in its case of their defensive concerns in seeking 
to resist trade liberalization.  To quote one close NGO observer regarding the Doha Round:  “If 
India wasn’t there, we’d have had this deal long ago and with no protections for developing 
countries.”13   
Despite considerable differences in their interests, both Brazil and India recognized the 
strategic value of an alliance.  Motivated by the expansion of its agribusiness sector, Brazil came 
to the Doha Round seeking to make significant gains in agriculture (Hopewell 2013).  Yet, it saw 
that it lacked sufficient power operating alone and needed allies.  As one Brazilian negotiator 
stated, “we needed a credible blocking coalition to start playing the game at the WTO.”14  Prior 
to Cancun, Brazil had begun looking for ways to construct a coalition to advance its interests, but 
was awaiting the right opportunity, which the US-EU agriculture proposal provided.  Given its 
major export interests, however, Brazil risked being perceived as a threat by most developing 
countries.  An alliance with India – the leading champion of the defensive interests of developing 
countries – was therefore of considerable tactical importance to Brazil:  in the words of one of its 
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negotiators, “we realized that we needed to reach out to India in order for us to have any 
credibility with developing countries.  For us it was a clear strategic move.”15   
 The alliance was equally vital for India.  In the past, India had repeatedly been left 
isolated in its opposition to the US and other dominant powers, painted as the lone 
“troublemaker” objecting to and blocking agreement.  Such pressure previously forced India to 
cave in and consent to agreements it was profoundly dissatisfied with.  Given its sensitivities in 
agriculture and other areas, combined with its experience of previous trade rounds, India knew 
that it needed a strong coalition of allies to effectively defend its interests in the Doha Round.  
Consequently, for India, to quote one of its former negotiators, “the G20-T was a compulsion.  
They knew they had to do something but they knew they couldn’t do it alone.”16  Although the 
initial impetus behind the G20-T and its subsidy reduction agenda came from Brazil, India 
embraced and became equally aggressive in pursuing this agenda as a means of advancing its 
own strategic interests.  The G20-T would not have been feasible without India, whose active 
participation and leadership was essential to securing the support of developing countries.   
It was the underlying partnership between Brazil and India that made the G20-T possible, 
but the two countries are forthright in acknowledging the tensions in their relationship.  As a 
Brazilian negotiator acknowledged,  
it was sheer personal interests forcing Brazil and India to get into a coalition.  We 
knew there were difficulties in trying to form a long-term coalition with the 
Indians given their difficulties in agriculture.  Our relationship with India is like a 
kind of very delicate embrace where you cannot leave each other.17 
   
An Indian negotiator concurred:   
It’s a coalition of the unwilling, let me admit.  But at the same time, we know we 
can’t have any kind of illusion of our status being equivalent to the G2 [the US 
and EU].  Even China has greater status than us.  But we know between the two of 
us [India and Brazil] there’s a formidable force that the G2 can’t ignore.18  
 
17 
 
Given their lesser economic weight, compared to either the traditional powers or China, neither 
Brazil nor India could rely on economic might alone.  Instead, they needed to ally together and 
secure the backing of the developing world more broadly to enhance their power and effectively 
counter the US and EU. 
Beyond the G20-T 
At the same time, concerns about the durability of its alliance with Brazil led India to 
diversify its strategy beyond the G20-T.  India is acutely aware of the differences in their 
interests and far from confident about the long-term loyalty or reliability of Brazil.  During the 
Uruguay Round, India and Brazil created and led a coalition – the G10 – to oppose the inclusion 
of services, investment and intellectual property in the round.  The coalition eventually 
collapsed, as its members were bought off with carrots and sticks from the US and other 
Northern powers; India was left the last one standing after Brazil conceded and was consequently 
forced to consent itself.  Contemporary Indian negotiators have a strong sense that the country 
was abandoned by Brazil, leaving it isolated and powerless to defend its interests.  To quote one 
Indian trade official, “Brazil can’t be trusted – they have a history of abandoning developing 
country positions.”19  India’s fears that it would not be able to count on Brazil in the endgame 
stage of the Doha negotiations motivated it to invest in developing other alliances.20 
India has been a leading force behind the G33, a second coalition that emerged at Cancun 
and has had a significant impact on the Doha negotiations.  The G33 is a large coalition of 
developing countries – currently comprised of 46 states – with defensive concerns in agriculture, 
whose objective is to limit the degree of market opening required of developing countries.  It has 
advocated the creation of a “special products” (SPs) exemption that would allow developing 
countries to shield some products from tariff cuts as well as a “special safeguard mechanism” 
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(SSM) that would allow them to raise tariffs in response to an import surge.  The stated intent of 
both instruments is to protect food security, rural livelihoods and rural development.  These were 
new initiatives, with an innovative rationale, and of considerable consequence:  combined with 
weaker tariff reduction formulas, the SPs exemption would significantly reduce the extent of 
liberalization required of developing countries in the round, while the SSM design advocated by 
India would allow developing countries to breach their pre-Doha commitments thus potentially 
rolling-back liberalization undertaken in the last round.  Although these measures were 
defensively-oriented, this was a proactive agenda involving the creation of new negotiation 
issues that generated substantial opposition from the US, EU, and other developed countries.  
India and the G33 not only succeeded in putting special products and the SSM onto the 
negotiating agenda but secured the commitment that they will be part of any final Doha 
agreement (Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Margulis 2013).  India led the charge for an expansive 
definition and operationalization of these measures and, as discussed below, conflict over the 
design of the SSM ultimately became a central issue in the breakdown of the 2008 Ministerial 
Meeting.   
More recently, under the auspices of the G33, India led an initiative to reform WTO 
subsidy limits to ensure the ability of developing countries to engage in public food stockholding 
for food security purposes.  India sought such changes to protect its landmark new food security 
program from WTO challenges.  This became the “make or break” issue at the 2013 Bali 
Ministerial (Bridges 2013).  Despite American opposition, India secured an interim agreement 
providing the needed exemption from WTO subsidy rules until a permanent solution can be 
negotiated.   
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Brazil and India’s leadership has extended beyond the G20-T and the G33.  Through the 
Core Group, India mobilized developing country opposition to the Singapore Issues (investment, 
competition and government procurement) – which further contributed to the breakdown at the 
Cancun Ministerial – and succeeded in forcing those issues off the negotiating table, representing 
a major victory for developing countries.  Brazil and India (along with South Africa) have also 
led developing countries to important victories in the area of intellectual property and access to 
medicines:  despite strong opposition from the US and EU and their pharmaceutical corporations, 
they secured an agreement in 2001 exempting essential medicines (such as HIV/AIDS drugs) 
from WTO intellectual property rules (the “TRIPs Agreement”) and declaring that such rules 
could not be used to prevent governments from acting to protect public health, as well as a 
waiver in 2003 allowing the export of generic drugs to developing countries that lack domestic 
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity.  In pursuing these initiatives, India was motivated in part 
by their commercial significance for its generic pharmaceutical industry, which played an 
important role in this fight (Roemer-Mahler 2012).  The intense opposition to TRIPs also 
prevented efforts by the US and EU to seek expanded IP protections (“TRIPs-Plus”) in the Doha 
Round.  In addition, Brazil and India have been key figures in the NAMA-11 coalition of 
developing countries in the negotiations on manufactured goods.  Under their leadership, 
developing countries secured major “special and differential treatment” (SDT) provisions, 
including weaker tariff-reduction formulas and substantial flexibilities in both agriculture and 
manufactured goods.  Beyond specific coalitions, Brazil and India have engaged in extensive 
coordination and alliance-building across the developing world.  At the 2005 Hong Kong 
Ministerial, for example, they led a mass coalition of developing countries (the G110) to oppose 
the agenda being pushed by the advanced-industrialized states.  Through a combination of formal 
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coalitions and more informal leadership, Brazil and India have organized a significant portion of 
the WTO’s membership behind them, which they used to play a major agenda-setting role and 
significantly shape the direction of the Doha Round.   
Building Effective Coalitions 
Developing country coalitions are not new to the WTO.  With India and Brazil playing a 
central role, developing countries began experimenting more actively with forming coalitions to 
increase their bargaining power during the Uruguay Round – the first to fully bring developing 
countries into the GATT/WTO by requiring them to undertake commitments (Gallagher 2008) – 
and leading up to the Doha Round (including the Informal Group, G10, and Like Minded 
Group).  However, as Amrita Narlikar (2003) has documented, these early coalitions were largely 
ineffective, hampered by the absence of a strong issue-specific focus, a lack of technical 
capacity, and an inability to maintain unity and resist collapse in the face of pressures from the 
dominant powers.  The collapse of their coalitions proved extremely costly for developing 
countries, who were left deeply dissatisfied with the results of the Uruguay Round (Wilkinson 
2007). 
An important question is thus why Brazil and India’s coalition-building efforts in the 
Doha Round were successful when previous such efforts had failed.  As Narlikar and co-authors 
(Hurrell and Narlikar 2006; Narlikar and Tussie 2004) convincingly argue, these new coalitions 
were the product of almost two decades of experimentation, learning and adaptation by 
developing countries.  Led by Brazil and India, they were able to learn from their previous 
mistakes in order to build stronger and more effective coalitions in this round.  Perhaps most 
importantly, coming out of their experiences in the Uruguay Round and the lead up to Doha, 
developing countries were keenly aware of the danger of political isolation and the costs of 
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failing to maintain unity (Lima and Hirst 2006).  Developing countries had a renewed and 
strengthened commitment to coalitions but needed effective leadership, which Brazil and India 
provided. 
The G20-T alliance forged by Brazil and India was the real game changer at the WTO 
and marked a break with previous coalitions in several important ways.  First, given the diverse 
(and potentially conflicting) interests of developing countries, building and maintaining 
coalitions at the WTO is no easy feat.  By constructing the agenda of the G20-T around the issue 
of rich country agricultural subsidies, Brazil and India found a means to overcome differences 
and unite developing countries.  Second, making the argument that subsidies artificially depress 
global prices and undermine the competitiveness and livelihoods of farmers in the Global South, 
the issue provided a compelling narrative that accorded with the liberalization mandate of the 
WTO and increased the legitimacy of the G20-T’s claims (Eagleton-Pierce 2012; Hopewell 
2013).  Third, and perhaps most importantly, while developing countries have repeatedly been on 
the defensive in WTO negotiations, the subsidies issue provided an opportunity to turn the tables 
and go on the offensive against the developed countries.  The G20-T turned the rhetoric of free 
trade and liberalization back on the major powers and highlighted their hypocrisy (Bukovansky 
2010; Taylor 2007).  In the process, this significantly strengthened the position of developing 
countries vis-à-vis the US and EU across the negotiations, including their ability to defend 
protections in their own markets.  
Diplomatic and technical capacity were critical to the ability of Brazil and India to create 
and manage the G20-T and other coalitions that could provide a credible challenge to the US and 
EU.  In the lead-up to the Doha Round, Brazil and India both invested heavily in staff and 
resources dedicated to the WTO (Shaffer, Sanchez and Rosenberg 2008; Sinha 2007).  They now 
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have among the largest delegations in Geneva, supported by highly trained officials in their 
capitals, and their negotiating teams are among the most skilled, active and knowledgeable at the 
WTO.  Brazil and India used their considerable diplomatic skill to coordinate the positions of 
developing countries; provide strategy, talking points and messaging; and produce compelling 
negotiating proposals backed by research and analysis.  Most developing countries are extremely 
limited in their technical capacity, and to quote one negotiator, “in this game, either you have the 
technical capacity or people will take your wallet.”21  Brazil and India were able to provide the 
highly sophisticated expertise and technical capacity (i.e., the ability to run econometric analysis, 
assess the impacts of specific commitments, and generate negotiating proposals) that most 
developing countries lacked.  This marked a major change from previous developing country 
coalitions and made it possible for them to respond to and counter the US and EU.  Brazil and 
India’s success in securing important gains for developing countries in the negotiations – 
including on the agriculture and industrial tariff reduction formulas and flexibilities, agriculture 
subsidies, SPs, the SSM, TRIPs and public health, and the Singapore Issues – consolidated 
support for their leadership and further enhanced their clout.  
The vital importance of coalitions for Brazil and India is apparent in the considerable 
work they have invested in creating and maintaining them, including the costs they have been 
willingly to incur.  Although developing countries represent significant markets for Brazil’s 
agricultural exports, for example, it held back from seeking improved access to their markets, 
because that would jeopardize the unity of the G20 and support for its leadership.22  Instead, 
Brazil supported efforts by developing countries to secure flexibilities that would limit the extent 
of their market opening, despite the negative commercial implications for its own exporters.  The 
importance of these coalitions is further evidenced by the concerted efforts of the traditional 
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powers to break them.  Following the Cancun Ministerial, for instance, the US went on the attack 
against the G20-T, using strong-arm tactics – including threating to withdraw from bilateral and 
regional free trade negotiations – to force five countries to leave the coalition.  The G20-T, 
however, ultimately withstood these pressures and remained intact, even replacing its lost 
members and increasing its numbers. 
Given the diverse interests of developing countries, Brazil and India’s leadership has not 
been without friction (Burges 2013).  Tensions within the G20-T and G33 reached a height at the 
2008 Ministerial, when it appeared negotiations were nearing conclusion; criticism erupted from 
developing countries on multiple sides over the positions Brazil and India had taken in the Green 
Room.  Tensions likewise flared within the G33 during the 2013 Bali Ministerial, when 
negotiations threatened to breakdown due to conflict between the US and India over the food 
stockholding issue (Bridges 2013).  Yet both the two leaders and their developing country 
followers are keenly aware that, as one G20-T member stated, “our strength lies in the group” 
and were these coalitions to crumble, their positions would be substantially weakened.23  Brazil 
and India actively worked to repair divisions and successfully maintained their coalitions intact.  
This does, however, suggest potential instability in the new-found power of Brazil and India, 
given its high degree of dependence on the backing of other states. 
It was Brazil and India’s leadership of developing country coalitions – particularly the 
G20-T and G33 – that catalyzed power shifts at the WTO and propelled them into the inner circle 
of power.  As one negotiator stated, “The US and EU aren’t talking to India because India is 
India.  They do it because India is seen as a leader of the G20-T and the G33, and if they don’t 
get an agreement with India, it’s not just India that will withdraw its support, it’s all of those 
countries.”24  A Brazilian negotiator concurred:  “there are various ways to be admitted [to the 
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inner circle].  For us, the G20-T served as a stepping stone to consolidate our access to the most 
exclusive negotiating forum [at the WTO].”25  Lacking the economic heft of other major powers, 
their mobilization of developing country coalitions was critical in enabling Brazil and India to 
boost their status and influence at the WTO.   
The Rise of China 
China’s rise to power and behavior have differed greatly from Brazil and India.  China 
only joined the WTO in 2001, after an arduous accession process that took over 15 years of 
negotiations and required China to undertake substantial concessions and domestic reforms.  Its 
accession corresponded with the launch of the Doha Round and many predicted it would assume 
a central role in the negotiations, given its prominent role in world trade.  Instead, however, for 
much of the Doha Round, China has been a relatively marginal player on the sidelines of 
decision-making.  While Brazil and India joined the elite inner circle at the WTO following 
Cancun in 2003, it was only much later – not until the Ministerial Meeting in July 2008 – that 
China was included in this core group and assumed a more significant role in the negotiations.  
Furthermore, whereas Brazil and India fought their way into the inner circle, China was brought 
in – and it was brought in largely because Brazil and India had been so successful in 
fundamentally changing the dynamics of the negotiations.   
A Quiet Presence 
If Brazil and India sought the spotlight at the WTO, China sought to avoid it.  Although a 
member of the G20-T and the G33, China made no effort to establish itself as a leader of 
developing countries like Brazil and India.  As its negotiators indicate, “China is not a leader and 
China does not want to be a leader” – “we would have to take the spotlight, and that is against 
China’s philosophy to be quiet, low profile, modest.”26  Such a strategy is in keeping with Deng 
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Xiaoping’s famous directive of “taoguang yanghui” that the country should “observe 
developments soberly, maintain our position, meet challenges calmly, hide our capabilities and 
bide our time, remain free of ambition, and never claim leadership.”  As a rival negotiator stated: 
“China doesn’t want a following…  China’s not like an India or a Brazil.  They stay behind and 
do not take on a prominent position at the forefront.”27  Instead, China has been remarkably quite 
and assumed a low-profile in the negotiations, with other negotiators describing it as “a little on 
the outside of things.”28  Unlike Brazil and India, China has sought to avoid prominence or any 
obvious projection of its power. 
China’s quietude is often attributed to the newness of its membership in the organization 
(Scott and Wilkinson 2013), and certainly China itself has sought to foster this interpretation.  
But after 15 years of intense accession negotiations and subsequently over a decade of 
membership in the WTO, China’s efforts to portray itself as new and inexperienced and still 
learning the ropes within the institution warrant skepticism.  China has important strategic 
reasons for its comparatively quiet behavior in the negotiations.  Its position at the WTO is a 
complicated one.  As the world’s largest exporter, China has a major interest in reducing trade 
barriers, further opening markets to its exports, and strengthening the rules of the multilateral 
trading system.  In fact, many expect that China would be one of the biggest winners from the 
Doha Round (Polaski 2006).  However, the size and rapid growth of its economy makes China a 
major target for other countries seeking access to its market.  At the same time, many countries 
are concerned about China’s industrial export capacity and the competitive threat that it poses.  
As an export powerhouse in an organization designed to open markets, China frightens many 
WTO members.  These factors create vulnerabilities for China, as it potentially faces both 
demands that it open its market and efforts to constrain its exports.  For China, being proactive or 
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aggressive in seeking to expand its access to foreign markets through the Doha Round risks 
creating a backlash that could ultimately jeopardize its exports and economic growth.  China has 
therefore exercised a form of pre-emptive restraint and avoided taking a leadership role or 
actively trying to shape the agenda of the negotiations.   
China has determined that the primary threat it faces is from the advanced-industrialized 
states – particularly the US – and consequently has allied itself with the developing world and 
joined developing country coalitions to strengthen its defenses and avoid being singled out and 
targeted.  As a member of the G20-T and the G33, China has allowed itself to be led and 
represented by Brazil and India.  Notes one observer, China is “happy to leave the leadership role 
to India and Brazil.  I’m sure they think there is enough China-bashing already.”29  Seeking the 
protection of developing country alliances and with Brazil and India advancing an agenda 
broadly in accord with its own interests, China was disposed to let those two countries wage the 
fight against the traditional powers.  A Secretariat official offered this assessment:  “they don’t 
waste capital if they have others that will do it for them.”30  Thus, as another official stated, for 
many years, China “effectively let Brazil and India run their participation” at the WTO.31   
China’s Entry to the Inner Circle 
It was not until the July 2008 Mini-Ministerial Meeting in Geneva that China was 
included in the inner circle and began to assume a more important role in the negotiations.  As 
usual at the Ministerial, the center of the action was the Green Room, where a small, elite group 
of trade ministers gathered for negotiations.  For the first time, however, China was invited to 
join this core group.  What changed to prompt the inclusion of China?  The decision was driven 
by the US and the WTO’s Director-General.  Their motives were two-fold.  First, four years of 
negotiations centered on the US, EU, Brazil, and India had produced a standstill – as the 
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breakdown of the previous Ministerial meeting the year before in Potsdam had shown.  Faced 
with an impasse – between the US and EU versus Brazil and India over the issues of agricultural 
subsidies and market access in the North and industrial tariffs in the South – there was a sense 
that it was necessary to re-jig the players in the group to try to break the standstill.  The US in 
particular – as well as others seeking a conclusion to the round – thought that China would side 
with them and help to counter India, whom the US blamed for holding up the deal.  As one 
official commented:  “The US believed that China would be more of an ally than an adversary in 
these meetings.  It made a calculation that because of China’s relatively passive approach to 
being the biggest developing country here and letting others run with the agenda, it would be an 
ally.”32  Similarly, another negotiator stated, “China has a lot to gain, so people thought bringing 
it to the table will help get a deal.  They thought it would put added pressure on India by having 
China in the room.”33 
The US also had a second motivation for including China.  While the US is interested in 
gaining improved access to the Chinese market through the Doha Round, China’s absence from 
the Green Room for most of the round indicates that the US expected to be able to secure these 
gains without directly engaging China.  The US believed that it needed only to strike a deal with 
Brazil and India, which would set the terms of its access to developing country markets, 
including China.  However, by 2008, Brazil and India, leading the developing world, had been so 
successful in resisting the pressures of the US and its allies and securing their own demands that 
the negotiations had moved toward a prospective agreement that provoked protest from powerful 
actors in US Congress and its business and farm lobby groups.  Many in the US viewed the deal 
taking shape – with what they saw as weak tariff-reduction formulas and extensive flexibilities 
for developing countries – as unbalanced against the US.  They argued that the US was not 
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making sufficient gains in expanding access for its exports, particularly to the large and rapidly 
growing Chinese market as well as those of other emerging economies, to justify its concessions 
on agriculture subsidies and other areas.  As one US negotiator put it, “we’d be giving everything 
and getting nothing.”34   
In response, US negotiators determined that the best way to improve the package and sell 
it to their domestic constituencies would be to secure special concessions from China beyond the 
formal terms of the agreement that was emerging.  The US sought an informal commitment from 
China that it would agree to limit the use of its flexibilities in agriculture (keeping key items of 
interest to the US – cotton, wheat and corn – off their list of special products that would be 
shielded from full tariff cuts) and participate in “sectorals” (aggressive liberalization to cut tariffs 
to zero or near zero across entire industrial sectors) in two areas of US competitiveness, 
chemicals and industrial machinery.  Thus, by the 2008 Ministerial, as one negotiator stated, “the 
main demands of the US and EU couldn’t be addressed without getting a ‘yes’ from China.  The 
US needed China to be there.”35  
 There were therefore two key factors driving the decision to bring China into the Green 
Room:  one was strategic – the US thought it could use China to put pressure on Brazil and India 
– the other was that because Brazil and India had been so successful in negotiating a favorable 
deal for developing countries and had backed the US into a corner, it needed to be able to secure 
extra concessions from China in order to sell the deal back home.  Unfortunately for the US, 
however, this strategy backfired.  Negotiations in the Green Room came to center on the design 
of the SSM championed by India.  Rather than joining with the US, China – who also has 
significant defensive agricultural interests arising from its large peasant population – supported 
India on the SSM.  Moreover, China refused to simply give away the additional commitments the 
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US was demanding on agricultural special products and industrial sectorals, which it saw as 
unjustified relative to the concessions the US was willing to make and beyond the scope of the 
terms already agreed to.  Ultimately, the Ministerial broke down with recriminations on all sides.   
Doha Breakdown 
On its face, the breakdown was due to conflict over the SSM, but the deeper issue was 
the US desire to “rebalance” the deal by securing greater access for its agriculture and 
manufactured goods to the markets of the large emerging economies, particularly China.  If 
China had conceded to the US and agreed to grant the additional concessions it was seeking, the 
Doha Round may well have been concluded in 2008.  Certainly, the US has a long track record in 
multilateral trade negotiations of successfully overpowering developing countries and securing 
their assent for its initiatives.  Instead, however, China stood firm, refused to cave to the US and 
rebuffed its demands for additional market opening.  Thus, when pushed, China showed that it is 
willing and able to assert itself and defend its interests against the US.  Given its economic heft 
and the importance of its market, by blocking the US initiative to “rebalance” the round, China 
effectively exercised a veto that contributed directly to the current breakdown and stalemate in 
the Doha Round.   
With the 2008 Ministerial, China was almost involuntarily pulled into the spotlight.  Even 
since being admitted to the inner circle in 2008, negotiators report that China has still tried to slip 
back into its comparatively quiet and low profile role in the negotiations.  Its attempts to do so 
have been less successful than in the past due to the US emphasis on gaining further opening in 
its market and those of other large emerging economies.  Yet China did not suddenly assume an 
activist role like that of Brazil and India. 
The Doha Round has remained deadlocked along the same fault line with no significant 
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progress since 2008.36  With the traditional and emerging powers unable to reach agreement, the 
Doha Round negotiations were officially declared at an impasse in 2011.  In December 2013, 
efforts to salvage a small number of issues from the round produced a micro-agreement – the 
“Bali Package” – centered on trade facilitation.  Yet even this very limited agreement proved 
fractious and difficult to achieve, and the future of the Doha Round remains highly uncertain.   
Some take the fact that the new powers have ultimately been unable to secure their 
objectives through conclusion of the Doha Round as an indication that they lack power (Narlikar 
2010; Schirm 2010).  I would argue, however, that this is an excessively high standard by which 
to evaluate the power of Brazil, India and China.  By this criterion, even the US could not be 
considered powerful, since it has not been able to conclude the round and achieve its preferred 
objectives either.  A more realistic standard of power at the WTO is to evaluate the impact that 
countries have had on the round.  By this measure, though the nature of their behavior and 
impact differ, Brazil, India and China have undoubtedly arrived as major powers. 
Conclusion 
An analysis of developments over the last decade at the WTO challenges the 
conventional wisdom that the rise of new powers in global economic governance is merely a 
function of their growing economic might.  Instead, I have argued that the forces driving their 
rise are more diverse and complex than suggested by a simple economic determinism and that 
these countries have taken different paths to power.  Although China’s rise has been more closely 
tied to its economic weight, for Brazil and India alliance-building and leadership have been 
critical to enhancing their power at the WTO.  My purpose has not been to deny the role of 
economic change in contemporary power shifts, but to suggest that an exclusive focus on 
economic capabilities risks missing important aspects of the rise of new powers in global 
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economic governance.   
This analysis points to the need to pay greater attention to differences in the sources of 
power of these countries, particularly as these differences have important implications for their 
strategies and behavior in international institutions like the WTO.  Brazil and India worked to 
position themselves as leaders of the developing world and assumed a confrontational stance in 
relation to the US and EU, as a means to elevate their status and influence.  Highly vocal and 
assertive, Brazil and India have been a major source of initiative and played a central role in 
shaping the agenda of the Doha negotiations.  In contrast, China has been reluctant to throw its 
weight around.  China has been assertive only in a defensive and reactive manner and has not 
sought to be an initiator or agenda-setter; yet, China nonetheless came to have a significant 
impact in the later stages of the round, when it refused to concede to US demands. 
In looking at the rise of new powers, the experience of the WTO suggests the need to 
look beyond material capabilities to understand emerging challenges to the dominance of the US 
and other states of the Global North in global economic governance.  The realist expectation is 
that those states with the greatest economic and military capabilities will dominate global 
governance and exercise the greatest influence.  But this case suggests just the opposite:  that the 
possession of material power capabilities can actually work to constrain a state and hinder its 
influence.  In this case, those with lesser economic and military might had more room to 
maneuver.  With fewer material power resources, Brazil and India were perceived as less of a 
threat and could therefore be more aggressive and proactive.  They were able to use leadership 
and alliances to enhance their influence, which ultimately enabled them to have a considerable 
impact on the negotiating agenda in the Doha Round.  Counter-intuitively, the emerging power 
with the greatest material power capabilities – China – has been the least proactive or agenda-
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setting in its effects.  The paradox is that the very things that we would expect to make China 
powerful at the WTO – its large market and role in world trade – limited its ability to exercise 
agenda-setting influence.  Instead, its influence has come in the form of veto power.  The 
structure of influence at the WTO is therefore far more complex than a mechanical reflection of 
the distribution of raw economic power.      
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1 While quota reforms of the IMF agreed in 2008 became effective in March 2011, further reforms agreed in 2010 
have yet to be ratified by the US. 
2 In the literature on rising powers, the line between the analytical and the normative at times appears blurred, such 
that the distinction between assessing the rise of new powers and making a case for their greater inclusion in global 
economic governance is not always clear.  Thus, in some instances, attempts to measure and catalogue the material 
resources of the rising powers may be more a question of arguing for their inclusion, rather than accepting military 
or economic capabilities as the sole measure of their power or influence.  The point remains, however, that 
discussions of the emerging powers have overwhelmingly focused on their material power capabilities. 
3 IMF and WTO 2012. 
4 The interviews not directly quoted in the paper were used for background information, to triangulate among 
different sources in order to accurately reconstruct events at the WTO, and to substantiate the selected quotes 
presented in the paper.  To protect the confidentiality of interview respondents in the diplomatic community 
surrounding the WTO, names and other identifying information have been removed. 
5 For Brazil, see:  Armijo and Kearney 2008; Hopewell 2013; Veiga 2007; India:  Dhar and Kallummal 2007; Sinha 
2007; China:  Feng 2006; Jiang 2010; Zeng 2007. 
6 Since Russia – the forth “BRIC” – did not become a member of the WTO until 2012 and was therefore not part of 
the power shift within the institution, it is not included in the analysis presented here.  
7 I use the term veto in the informal, practical sense of having the power to block an initiative or agreement; no state 
has formal, legal veto power at the WTO.   
8 I refer to the coalition of developing countries at the WTO as the G20-Trade (G20-T) to avoid confusion with the 
G20 Leaders Summit. 
9 Interview, Geneva, May 2009. 
10 Interview, Geneva, March 2009. 
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Hopewell 2013).   
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